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Abstract
The linear or threshold Public Goods game (PGG) is extensively accepted as a paradigmatic model to approach the
evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas. Here we explore the significant effect of nonlinearity of the structures of public
goods on the evolution of cooperation within the well-mixed population by adopting Darwinian dynamics, which
simultaneously consider the evolution of populations and strategies on a continuous adaptive landscape, and extend the
concept of evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) as a coalition of strategies that is both convergent-stable and resistant to
invasion. Results show (i) that in the linear PGG contributing nothing is an ESS, which contradicts experimental data, (ii) that
in the threshold PGG contributing the threshold value is a fragile ESS, which cannot resist the invasion of contributing
nothing, and (iii) that there exists a robust ESS of contributing more than half in the sigmoid PGG if the return rate is
relatively high. This work reveals the significant effect of the nonlinearity of the structures of public goods on the evolution
of cooperation, and suggests that, compared with the linear or threshold PGG, the sigmoid PGG might be a more proper
model for the evolution of cooperation within the well-mixed population.
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Introduction
The evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas has attracted
broad interests across disciplines [1–5]. Social dilemmas are situa-
tions in which individual rationality leads to collective irrationality
[6,7]. They are pervasive in all kinds of relationships, from the
interpersonal to the international. For example, a public local
library financed through donations benefits all people in the
community. One can benefit most if he donates nothing. However,
if everyone reasoned like this, the library would not keep running
dueto the lack offinance,and all peoplewouldbe worstoff[8]. This
is a Public Goods dilemma. There exists another kind of social
dilemmacalled commons dilemma.Forexample,farmerslivingina
common grassland can benefit more by raising as many cattle as
they want.However,if everyfarmerreasoned like this,the grassland
would be depleted very soon, and all farmers would worst off [6].
Thesame reasoning applies tothesetwokindsofsocialdilemmas, so
we focus on the Public Goods dilemma, which is usually modeled as
a Public Goods game (PGG).
In a traditional PGG experiment, some subjects form a group.
Each subject is endowed with a certain amount of money, and
they have to decide how much to invest in the public project,
which is increased to a multiple of it and then split evenly among
all subjects. So the gains of the subjects consist of two parts: the
money left that they do not invest and the money gained from
investing in the public project. For example, each of a four-
member group is given 20 money units (MUs), and the money
invested in the public project is doubled. If all members invest 20
MUs, everyone will have 40 MUs. However, every invested MU
only returns a half, and thus all members have an incentive to keep
all money in pocket. If you defect by investing zero while every
other member invests 20 MUs, you will have 50 MUs while other
members 30 MUs per person. If all members defect, everyone
ends up with 20 MUs and the benefit of the public project is
forgone. Consequently a dilemma arises. Since every invested
MU returns a half, from now on we call it a linear PGG, instead
(Fig. 1).
In the linear PGG, investing nothing is the only equilibrium.
That is, no one can gain more by investing more than zero no
matter how much others invest. However, whether in linear PGG
experiments or in real life, people often invest more than zero [9].
To better understanding people’s behaviors, the threshold PGG is
extensively researched (Fig. 1). In the threshold PGG, there exits
a provision point or threshold value. If the total sum of the
contributions is less than it, all contributions are lost, whereas if
the total sum exceeds it, a fixed amount of the public good is
gained. In contrast to the linear PGG, the threshold PGG has
other equilibria except investing nothing. That is, any combina-
tion of contributions that sum to the provision point is an
equilibrium. For example, each of a four-member group is given
20 MUs, and when the money invested in the public project
reached 60 MUs every member is given extra 40 MUs. Then
every member invests 15 MUs is an equilibrium. Three investing
20 MUs and one investing zero is another equilibrium. A
threshold PGG is a dilemma with a coordination game embedded
in it [8].
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with an obvious or clearly defined provision point. For
example, in order to establish and maintain a public local
library, those initial donations are important. Once the library
starts to run, extra donations are also important for keep it
running smoothly. But they are not as important as those that
finally make possible the establishment of the library.
Therefore, a tilted S-shaped continuous function such as a
sigmoid function may provide a better model of many social
dilemmas [8,10–12]. We refer to a PGG with this kind of
structure as a sigmoid PGG (Fig. 1). As pointed out in [11], the
linear or threshold PGG is a simplification, or rather an
extreme version of the sigmoid PGG.
So far, there have been very few efforts made to directly
explore the effect of nonlinearity of the structures of public
goods on the evolution of cooperation. In [10], a rather simple
model was employed to independently analyze the accelerating,
linear, and decelerating portions of the S-shaped function, so
that the complexity of directly dealing with the S-shaped
function itself was circumvented. In [12], the authors concluded
by adopting replicator dynamics that the threshold PGG
(therein is called the Volunteer’s Dilemma) is a good
approximation of any public goods games in which the public
good is a nonlinear function of the number of cooperators (see
further comparison to our analysis in section Results and
Discussion). Here we will apply Darwinian dynamics [4,13–16]
to analyze the evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS) of these
three kinds of PGGs, and try to show that the sigmoid PGG is
really a more proper model for the evolution of cooperation
within the well-mixed population, compared with the linear or
threshold PGG in that it can reinforce our understanding of
people’s behaviors in the real world.
Analysis
The pioneering definition of ESS, which is originated by
Maynard Smith and Price, refers to a strategy that, when
common, can resist the invasion of a minority of any other
strategy [17]. Resistance to invasion is a static concept, since it
says nothing about what would happen if the population starts at
(or is perturbed to) a nearby point [15]. Therefore, an ESS which
does not require convergence stability may be unattainable
through strategy dynamics by natural selection. This leads to
the proliferation of related terminology such as evolutionarily
unbeatable strategy, d-stability, internal stability, and evolution-
arily singular strategy [18].
In contrast, Darwinian dynamics use a fitness-generating
function (G-function) approach to continuous-trait evolutionary
games [13,14]. The G-function allows for simultaneous con-
sideration of population dynamics and strategy dynamics. An ESS
is redefined as a coalition of strategies that is both convergent-
stable and resistant to invasion, which is a natural extension of
the original definition of Maynard Smith and Price. Those
strategies consisting of an ESS are evolutionarily stable maxima
on the adaptive landscape [4]. Here we adopt this definition of
ESS.
In the following, we first introduce Darwinian dynamics and the
extended concept of ESS. Then we analyze these three kinds of
PGGs in this context. After the relatively simple linear and sigmoid
PGGs are analyzed, the threshold PGG, which is not continuously
differentiable so that the G-function approach cannot be directly
Figure 1. The three kinds of structures of the PGG. (Dash-dot) The linear PGG, gl(x)~x.( Solid) The sigmoid PGG, gs(x)~sin
2 (px=2).
(Dashed) The threshold PGG, gt(x)~0 if 0ƒxv1=2, and 1 if 1=2ƒxƒ1.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0025496.g001
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structure of power functions.
The G-function Approach
The G-function approach is mainly developed by Vincent, Brown,
and their coauthors [4,13,14,16]. We begin with introducing the
fitness-generating function (G-function). Assume that there are s
populations, and that the i-th population adopts the strategy ui
and its frequency is pi[P~½0,1 . All strategies ui’s are limited in
the evolutionarily feasible set U. We set u~½u1,u2,...,us [Us and
p~½p1,p2,...,ps [Ps. The G-function G(v,u,p) represents the
fitness of the i-th population when the virtual variable v[U is
replaced with ui.
Darwinian dynamics consist of population dynamics and
strategy dynamics. In terms of the G-function G(v,u,p), the
population dynamics are given by
_ p pi~pi G(v,u,p){G
  
, ð1Þ
where
G~
X s
i~1
piG(v,u,p)jv~ui: ð2Þ
When strategies ui’s do not evolve with time, they are equivalent to
the replicator dynamics [19,20]. The strategy dynamics are given
by
_ u ui~h
LG(v,u,p)
Lv
       
v~ui
, ð3Þ
where h is a positive factor that influences the speed of the
evolution of strategies [16]. In the special case that one extant
strategy is invaded by one rare mutant strategy, they reduce to the
adaptive dynamics [14,18,21,22].
A non-trivial equilibrium point p ~½p 
1,...,p 
s [Ps (reorder the
indexes if necessary) is called an ecologically stable equilibrium point, if
it satisfies that
p 
i w0 with G(v,u,p){G
  
v~ui,p~p ~0, ð4aÞ
for i~1,...,s,
p 
i ~0, for i~sz1,...,s, ð4bÞ
and that every trajectory starting from a point which is in Ps and
near p  remains in Ps for all time and converges to p  as time
approaches infinity. The strategies corresponding to p  is denoted
by u ~½u 
c,u 
m , where
u 
c~½u 
1,...,u 
s , ð5aÞ
u 
m~½u 
sz1,...,u 
s : ð5bÞ
The coalition of strategies u 
c[Us is defined as an evolutionarily stable
strategy (ESS), if p  is an ecologically stable equilibrium point for
any u 
m[Us{s. The adaptive landscape is simply a plot of
G(v,u,p){G
  
versus the virtual variable v with u and p fixed.
The ESS Maximum Principle [13] states that
G(v,u,p){G
  
u~u ,p~p  must take on its maximum value, 0,a sa
function of v[U at v~u 
1,...,u 
s.
Here we assume that the evolution of strategy is slower than that
of population (but in all of the following invasion simulations we do
not make this assumption), and focus on the ESS coalition of one
strategy where u 
c~u 
1 and p 
1~1. On the adaptive landscape, a
stable minimum indicates an evolutionary branching point. The
population which evolves to branching points may diverge into
two separate populations or species with distinct strategies [18,22].
Both unstable maxima and unstable minima are repelling points,
and they should not be observed in nature [15]. An ESS is an
global fitness maximum and convergently stable [14].
In the interior of U, a necessary condition for u 
1 to resist the
invasion of rare mutant strategies is given by
LG(v,u 
1,p 
1)
Lv
       
v~u 
1
~0, ð6aÞ
L
2G(v,u 
1,p 
1)
Lv2
       
v~u 
1
v0: ð6bÞ
A necessary condition for the convergence stability of u 
1 is given
by
L
2G(v,u 
1,p 
1)
Lv2 z
L
2G(v,u 
1,p 
1)
Lu 
1Lv
"#
v~u 
1
v0: ð7Þ
The linear PGG is played in a group of n interacting members.
Each member is endowed with c units of utility, and they have to
decide how much to invest in the public project. The total units of
utility invested in the public project is multiplied by a positive
number r and then split evenly among all members. If r§n,n o
member will lose anything no matter how much he invests. If rƒ1,
no member can gain more no matter how much he invests. So the
number r is restricted between one and n. Group members benefit
most when all cooperate, but each has an incentive to contribute
nothing because every invested unit of utility only returns r=n units
of utility and thus cooperation incurs cost c(1{r=n) to himself. So
the group will no doubt end up all members contributing nothing
when they get experienced and the benefit of the public project is
forgone. This is the dilemma all group members face. The interests
of individuals totally contradict the interest of the group.
From now on we set c~1 with no loss of generality, since it has
no effect on the nature of the dilemma. We subsequently apply this
G-function approach to the aforementioned three kinds of PGGs,
so as to analyze the dependence of cooperation levels on the
structures of Public Goods.
For the PGG, if the populations are evolutionarily stable in the
evolutionarily feasible set U~½0,1 , the expected contribution from
any random group member is
Xs
i~1 piui. In a group of n
members, if the focal member decides to contribute v[U, then the
average contribution As(v) is given by
As(v)~
1
n
vz(n{1)
X s
i~1
piui
"#
: ð8Þ
Thus the return from the public good for the focal member is
rg½As(v) , and the G-function is given by
Adaptive Evolution of Cooperation
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where the function g(x) is supposed to represent the structure of
the public good (Fig. 1).
The Linear PGG
In the special case of the linear PGG of our interest here (Fig. 1),
we set
g(x)~gl(x)~x, ð10Þ
and thus the G-function is
G(v,u,p)~rAs(v){v: ð11Þ
It follows that
LG(v,u,p)
Lv
:
r
n
{1v0, ð12Þ
which is independent of the composition of the population. Group
members can always benefit more by reducing their contributions,
so there exists no ESS in the interior of ½0,1 .
However, this also gives us a hint that contributing nothing,
where u 
1~0 and p 
1~1, is the only possible ESS. Considering that
the adaptive landscape
G(v,u 
1,p 
1){G
  
u 
1~0, p 
1~1~
r
n
{1
  
v ð13Þ
reaches its global maximum, 0, in ½0,1  when v~0 (Fig. 2),
contributing nothing is surely an ESS for the linear PGG.
Similarly, we can conclude that another boundary value of ½0,1 ,
contributing all, where u 
1~1 and p 
1~1, is not an ESS, since the
adaptive landscape
G(v,u 
1,p 
1){G
  
u 
1~1, p 
1~1~ 1{
r
n
  
(1{v) ð14Þ
reaches its global minimum, 0, in ½0,1  when v~1 (Fig. 2).
A simulation of altruistic cooperators who contribute all (i.e.,
v~1) invading the population of defectors who contribute nothing
(i.e., v~0) is shown in Fig. 3. The result shows that the ESS v~0 is
rather robust against invasion. Yet this contradicts the fact that the
mean contributions usually end up with between 40% and 60% in
experiments [9].
The Sigmoid PGG
In the special case of the sigmoid PGG (Fig. 1), we set
g(x)~gs(x)~sin
2 p
2
x
  
: ð15Þ
Other functions with similar properties are of course possible, but
not explored here for simplicity. Thereby the G-function is
simplified as
G(v,u,p)~rsin
2 p
2
As(v)
hi
{v: ð16Þ
We examine the one-strategy ESS (coalition of one strategy);
that is, s~1. When u 
c~u 
1 and p 
1~1, the G-function (Fig. 4) is
G(v,u 
1,p 
1)~rsin
2 p
2
A1(v)
hi
{v
~rsin
2 p
2n
½vz(n{1)u 
1 
no
{v:
ð17Þ
It follows that
LG(v,u 
1,p 
1)
Lv
       
v~u 
1
~
pr
2n
sin½pA1(u 
1) {1
~
pr
2n
sin(pu 
1){1:
ð18Þ
If rv
2n
p
,
LG(v,u 
1,p 
1)
Lv
v0. We can verify that v~0 is the global
maximum in ½0,1  of the adaptive landscape
Figure 2. The adaptive landscapes in the linear PGG. u1~0 is an ESS which sits at the top of the adaptive landscape. Parameters: u1~0, 0:33,
0:66, and 1; n~10; and r~8.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0025496.g002
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1,p 
1){G
  
u 
1~0, p 
1~1~rsin
2 p
2n
v
  
{v: ð19Þ
Hence, if rv
2n
p
, contributing nothing is also an ESS for the
sigmoid PGG, just as in the case of the linear PGG.
When r§
2n
p
, the equation
LG(v,u 
1,p 
1)
Lv
       
v~u 
1
~0 has two
solutions in ½0,1 :
u 
1,1~
1
p
arcsin
2n
pr
  
, ð20Þ
and
u 
1,2~1{
1
p
arcsin
2n
pr
  
§
1
2
: ð21Þ
We can identify u 
1,2 as an ESS candidate by verifying the following
two conditions,
L
2G(v,u 
1,2,p 
1)
Lv2
         
v~u 
1,2
~
p2r
2n2 cos½pA1(u 
1,2) 
~
p2r
2n2 cos(pu 
1,2)v0,
ð22Þ
and
L
2G(v,u 
1,2,p 
1)
Lv2 z
L
2G(v,u 
1,2,p 
1)
Lu 
1,2Lv
         
v~u 
1,2
~
p2r
2n
cos½pA1(u 
1,2) ~
p2r
2n
cos(pu 
1,2)v0:
ð23Þ
Similarly, we can show that u 
1,1 is an unstable fitness minimum.
Hence there exists a stable state of the population contributing
u 
1,2, which is more than half, if the return rate r is relatively high.
A simulation of defectors who contribute nothing (i.e., v~0)
invading the population of individuals who play the ESS (i.e.,
v~u 
1,2) is shown in Fig. 5. The result shows that the ESS is surely
able to resist the invasion.
Figure 3. An invasion simulation of Darwinian dynamics of the linear PGG. (Upper-left) Evolution of the frequencies of the ESS and the
invader strategy starting from 20% and 80% respectively. (Upper-right) Evolution of the ESS and the invader strategy starting from ESS~0 and
Invader~1 and ending up with the latter evolving to the former. (Lower) Evolution of the adaptive landscape and the two strategies: tv0 (i.e.,
before the invasion happens), ESS~0 is the global maximum; t~0 (i.e., the invasion happens), the adaptive landscape is elevated with ESS~0 still
being the global maximum and Invader~1 being the global minimum; t~1:3, the invader strategy climbs up with the adaptive landscape going
down; t§5:5, the invader strategy coincides with ESS~0 and reaches the top of the adaptive landscape, which falls back to the state before the
invasion happens. Parameters: n~10, r~8, and h~0:9.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0025496.g003
Adaptive Evolution of Cooperation
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For the special case of the threshold PGG (Fig. 1), we set
g(x)~gt(x)~
0, if 0ƒxv
1
2
,
1, if
1
2
ƒxƒ1:
8
> <
> :
ð24Þ
Yet the discontinuity of gt(x) inhibits the application of Darwinian
dynamics to our research into the process of evolution. Instead, we
adopt a class of power functions gk(x), where k~1,2,...,t o
approach function gt(x) (Fig. 6); that is,
gt(x)& lim
k??
gk(x)~ lim
k??
1
2
½(2x{1)
1
2kz1z1 : ð25Þ
Other functions with similar properties are of course possible, but
not explored here for simplicity. Hence the G-function can be
expressed as
G(v,u,p)~
r
2
f½2As(v){1 
1
2kz1z1g{v: ð26Þ
We still focus on the one-strategy ESS where s~1. When
u 
c~u 
1 and p 
1~1, the adaptive landscape (Fig. 6) is
G(v,u 
1,p 
1)~
r
2
f½2A1(v){1 
1
2kz1z1g{v
~
r
2
2
n
(vz(n{1)u 
1){1
   1
2kz1
z1
()
{v:
ð27Þ
It follows that
LG(v,u 
1,p 
1)
Lv
       
v~u 
1
~
r
(2kz1)n
½2A1(u 
1){1 
{ 2k
2kz1{1
~
r
(2kz1)n
(2u 
1{1)
{ 2k
2kz1{1:
ð28Þ
The equation
LG(v,u 
1,p 
1)
Lv
       
v~u 
1
~0 also has two solutions in ½0,1 :
u 
1,1~
1
2
{
1
2
r
(2kz1)n
   (1z 1
2k)
, ð29Þ
and
u 
1,2~
1
2
z
1
2
r
(2kz1)n
   (1z 1
2k)
: ð30Þ
We can identify u 
1,2 as an ESS candidate by verifying the
following two conditions,
L
2G(v,u 
1,2,p 
1)
Lv2
         
v~u 
1,2
~{
4kr
(2kz1)
2n2 ½2A1(u 
1,2){1 
{(1z 2k
2kz1)
~{
4kr
(2kz1)
2n2 (2u 
1,2{1)
{(1z 2k
2kz1)v0,
ð31Þ
Figure 4. The adaptive landscapes in the sigmoid PGG. u1~0:707 is an ESS which sits at the top of the adaptive landscape. u1~0:293 is an
unstable minimum which sits at the bottom of the adaptive landscape. Parameters: u1~0, 0:22, 0:293, 0:38, 0:62, 0:707, 0:78, and 1; n~10; and r~8.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0025496.g004
Adaptive Evolution of Cooperation
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 6 October 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 10 | e25496and
L
2G(v,u 
1,2,p 
1)
Lv2 z
L
2G(v,u 
1,2,p 
1)
Lu 
1,2Lv
         
v~u 
1,2
~{
4kr
(2kz1)
2n
½2A1(u 
1,2){1 
{(1z 2k
2kz1)
~{
4kr
(2kz1)
2n
(2u 
1,2{1)
{(1z 2k
2kz1)v0:
ð32Þ
Similarly, we can show that u 
1,1 is an unstable fitness minimum.
With increasing k, u 
1,1 monotonically decreases, whereas u 
1,2
monotonically increases, and both approach the threshold value
1=2 (Fig. 6).
Fig. 6 also shows that, in contrast to the ESS in the sigmoid
PGG, here just on the left side of u 
1,2 there exists a global
minimum, which makes the ESS is rather fragile. This point is
fully exposed in Fig. 7, where only 0:1% invaders of defectors
who contribute nothing (i.e., v~0) drove the whole population
to the stable state of contributing nothing with a much faster
speed relative to that in Fig. 3 or Fig. 5. Hence the threshold
PGG basically does not have much advantage over the linear
PGG.
Results and Discussion
In summary, by adopting Darwinian dynamics, we have
explored the significant effect of nonlinearity of the structures of
public goods on the evolution of cooperation within the well-
mixed population. The threshold PGG does not have much
advantage over the linear PGG, whereas in the sigmoid PGG
there exists a one-strategy ESS of the whole population con-
tributing more than half. This suggests that the sigmoid PGG
might be a more proper mathematical model for the research of
the evolution of cooperation within the well-mixed population,
and thereby may release researchers from the shackles of the linear
or threshold PGG.
In contrast to most work in which replicator dynamics or
adaptive dynamics were applied to the evolution of cooperation in
social dilemmas [12,22], here we adopt Darwinian dynamics
mainly developed by Vincent, Brown, and their coauthors, which
simultaneously consider the evolution of populations and strategies
on a continuous adaptive landscape [4,13,14,16]. In Darwinian
dynamics, the concept of ESS is extended as a coalition of
strategies that is both convergent-stable and resistant to invasion,
Figure 5. An invasion simulation of Darwinian dynamics in the sigmoid PGG. (Upper-left) Evolution of the frequencies of the ESS and the
invader strategy starting from 80% and 20% respectively. (Upper-right) Evolution of the ESS and the invader strategy starting from ESS~0:707 and
Invader~0 and ending up with the latter evolving to the former. (Lower) Evolution of the adaptive landscape and the two strategies: tv0 (i.e.,
before the invasion happens), ESS~0:707 is the global maximum; t~0 (i.e., the invasion happens), the adaptive landscape is reshaped with
ESS~0:707 sitting at the left of the global maximum and Invader~0 being the global minimum; t~1:3, the two strategies climb up so that the
adaptive landscape is reshaped with the global maximum sitting between the two strategies; t§30, the two strategies coincide and reach the top, at
ESS~0:707, of the adaptive landscape, which falls back to the state before the invasion happens. Parameters: n~10, r~8, and h~0:9.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0025496.g005
Adaptive Evolution of Cooperation
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Price might be unattainable through strategy dynamics by natural
selection. This well-developed framework provides us with another
wonderful mathematical tool for the research related to natural
selection.
To our knowledge the only systematic theoretical analysis until
now of the effect of nonlinearity of the structures of public goods
on the evolution of cooperation is [12], in which a series of
functions 1=(1ze{kx) were adopted to explore the sigmoid PGG
and their limit function when k?? was used to approach the
threshold PGG, and the authors concluded that the threshold
PGG is a good approximation of any public goods games in which
the public good is a nonlinear function of the number of
cooperators. However, compared to Eqn. (28) we adopt here,
1=(1ze{kx) is not a good approximation due to its asymptotic
nature. For example, this series of functions cannot represent full
cooperation (or full defection) even though all individuals are
cooperators (or defectors).
Both in the sigmoid PGG approximated by 1=(1ze{kx) and in
the threshold PGG approximated either by limk?? 1=(1ze{kx)
or by Eqn. (25), the ESS (note the different definition of ESS in our
analysis from [12]) is accompanied by an unstable cooperation
level (Figs. 6 and 7), which makes the ESS is rather fragile. In
contrast, in the sigmoid PGG approximated here by Eqn. (15) the
ESS is the only global extreme point in the interior of the
evolutionarily feasible set U~½0,1  (Figs. 4 and 5). This suggests
that the sigmoid PGG might be a more proper model for the
evolution of cooperation within the well-mixed population, in that
it hosts a non-trivial evolutionarily stable cooperation level when
the return rate is relatively high, whereas the linear or threshold
PGG never does.
Note that our results are reached within the well-mixed
population. There exist different possibilities if we adopt other
assumptions on the population, the group size, or the structure of
the PGG. For example, within structured populations with different
group sizes, the coexistence of cooperation and defection is possible
even for the linear PGG due to noise underlying strategy adoptions
[23]. The exploration of the linear PGG that requires a minimum
collective investment to ensure any benefit shows that decisions
within small groups under high risk significantly raise the chances of
coordinating actions [24]. In addition, the relative size of the
threshold value of the threshold PGGmight also affect the evolution
of cooperation within the structured population [25].
However, our work does show the significant effect of
nonlinearity of the structures of public goods on the evolution of
cooperation within the well-mixed population. Actually, when x
increases from 0 to 1, the slope of the S-shaped function g(x) goes
through a process from accelerating to decelerating. Simulations
show that this property of g(x) plays a key role for the existence of
a robust ESS in the PGG within a well-mixed population.
Naturally, an interesting future work might be to search for the
optimal structure of public goods in the sense that complete
cooperation is a robust global ESS in the PGG with this kind of
structure, and the way to implement it in the real world.
Figure 6. The approximate representative of the threshold PGG by a class of power functions. (Upper-left) gk(x)~½(2x{1)
1
2kz1z1 =2
where k~1, 4, and 500.( Upper-right) the ESS and the unstable minimum as the functions of parameter k. They are getting closer and closer with
increasing k.( Lower) the adaptive landscapes when k~500, and u1~0, 0:4996, 0:5004, and 1. u1~0:5004 is an ESS which sits at the top of the
adaptive landscape. u1~0:4996 is an unstable minimum at the bottom of the adaptive landscape. Parameters: n~10, and r~8.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0025496.g006
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Figure 7. An invasion simulation of Darwinian dynamics in the threshold PGG which is approximated by gk(x)~½(2x{1)
1
2kz1z1 =2
where k~500. (Upper-left) Evolution of the frequencies of the ESS and the invader strategy starting from 99:9% and 0:1% respectively. (Upper-
right) Evolution of the ESS and the invader strategy starting from ESS~0:5004 and Invader~0 and ending up with the former evolving to the
latter. (Lower) Evolution of the adaptive landscape and the two strategies: tv0 (i.e., before the invasion happens), ESS~0:5004 is the global
maximum; t~0 (i.e., the invasion happens), the adaptive landscape is elevated with ESS~0:5004 being the global minimum and Invader~0 being
the local maximum; t~0:03, the ‘‘ESS’’ climbs up towards the invader strategy with the latter keeping sitting at the local maximum of the reshaped
adaptive landscape; t§0:55, the ‘‘ESS’’ coincides with Invader~0 and reaches the top of the reshaped adaptive landscape, which means the success
of the invader strategy and the failure of the ‘‘ESS’’. Parameters: n~10, r~8, and h~0:9.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0025496.g007
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